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Abstract
This paper provides ﬁrst evidence on the anatomy of human capital externalities
arising from both ﬁrm-level and regional human capital. Using panel data from Ger-
man social security records, both at an individual and aggregated at the plant and
regional level, I estimate earnings functions incorporating measures of regional and
ﬁrm-level human capital while controlling for various types of unobserved heterogene-
ity. The results suggest that the ﬁrm-level share of high-skilled workers generates
positive, although small social returns to education for low-skilled and skilled workers
but not for the high-skilled. This ﬁnding is in line with learning based theories of
human capital externalities. Some estimates also suggest negative social returns for
the regional shares of low-skilled workers. No such eﬀects are found for the ﬁrm-level
shares of low-skilled workers and the regional shares of high-skilled workers.
Keywords: Human capital externalities, social returns to education, error-component
model
JEL Classiﬁcation: D62, J24, J31, R11
Empirical Economics, Institute of Economics, Leuphana University Lueneburg, braak-
mann@uni.leuphana.de, Tel.: 0049 (0) 4131 677 2303, Fax: 0049 (0) 4131 677 2026
Stata 10.1 was used in all calculations. All do-ﬁles are available from the author on request. The data
used in this paper can be accessed via the research data center of the Federal Employment Agency in the
Institute of Employment Research in Nuremberg. See http://fdz.iab.de for details. The author would like
to thank Joachim Wagner for helpful hints and overall support. All remaining errors are my own.
11 Introduction
This paper considers for the ﬁrst time the importance of both regional and ﬁrm-level
human capital for the existence of human capital externalities. Results based on panel
data from German social security, used at the individual and aggregated at the plant
and regional level, suggest signiﬁcant positive eﬀects of the ﬁrm-level share of high-skilled
workers on the wages of low-skilled and skilled workers but not on the wages of high-skilled
workers. However, the wage increases caused by variation in the ﬁrm-level share of high-
skilled workers are often relatively small over empirically relevant shares. Some estimates
also suggest negative wage eﬀects for the regional shares of low-skilled workers. No such
eﬀects are found for the ﬁrm-level shares of low-skilled workers and the regional shares of
high-skilled workers. Overall, the results suggest that learning-spillovers from high- to low-
skilled workers might matter on the ﬁrm level, while no support is found for the existence
of social returns to education on the regional level.
On a theoretical level, the existence of a relationship between some measure of average
human capital and individual wages, even when controlling for individual human capital,
typically referred to as either human capital externalities or social returns to education has
been explained by a number of ideas. The ﬁrst relates to “pecuniary externalities” that
arise through the interaction of ﬁrms’ and workers’ investment decisions under imperfect
information (see Acemoglu 1996 for a formal model). The basic idea may be sketched as
follows: Firms investment decisions are positively inﬂuenced by the qualiﬁcation level of
the (regional) workforce as this allows ﬁrms to replace quitting workers more easily (see
Acemoglu 1997a for a formal model) what in turns inﬂuences workers decisions to invest in
human capital. The externalities arise because ﬁrms may not observe the true qualiﬁcation
2or productivity of single workers which has two eﬀects. First, ﬁrms use regional average
human capital as an indicator when deciding on future investments. This creates a posi-
tive relationship between regional human capital and – through the fact that human and
physical capital are assumed to be complements – higher wages. Second, workers and ﬁrms
are matched imperfectly which means that some low productive workers are matched to
workplaces with higher amounts of physical capital and higher wages than in a competitive
market with perfect information. These models eﬀectively predict a relationship between
the regional supply of high-productive or high-qualiﬁed workers and average wages of all
skill groups.
Another idea is an improvement of the matching-process between workers and ﬁrms.
The general idea that can be traced back to Marshall’s “Principles of Economics” (Marshall
1890/1961) is that a high share of workers with a certain level of education in a certain
region implies a high number of jobs for workers with that qualiﬁcation level. This in
turn raises the likelihood of “good” worker-ﬁrm-matches and consequently productivity
and wages. Note that this explanation predicts a positive relationship between the supply
of workers of a certain qualiﬁcation level and the wages of workers with this qualiﬁcation
level.
Finally, another line of theoretical reasoning leads to “non-pecuniary” or technological
externalities. The basic idea here is that workers may learn from each other through
interactions, learning by doing or imitation (for formal models for regional human capital
see Lucas 1988, Jovanovic and Rob 1989, Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 1991, Benabou 1996,
Acemoglu 1997b, Glaeser 1999, Acemoglu and Angrist 2000; Martins and Jin 2008 provide
a formal model in terms of workplace interactions). A higher share of productive or high-
qualiﬁed workers enhances the likelihood of such knowledge spillovers and consequently
3leads to higher regional productivity and growth. If one is willing to assume that learning
spillovers are more likely to occur from higher to lower qualiﬁed workers, one would expect
a positive relationship between individual wages and the share of workers with a higher
qualiﬁcation than the respective individual.
The growing empirical literature on this subject has reached mixed results for exter-
nalities arising from regional, industry- or ﬁrm-level human capital. On the regional level,
the pioneering study by Rauch (1993) uses cross-sectional data from the United States and
ﬁnds evidence for externalities on the order of 3-5 percent per year of average schooling in a
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area. Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) exploit compulsory
schooling and child labor laws in an instrumental variable-estimation using data from the
1960 to 1980 US-censuses. Their ﬁndings suggest insigniﬁcant returns to state wide school-
ing in the magnitude of roughly 1 percent per year of average schooling. Moretti (2004a)
uses NLSY and census data from the US and ﬁnds external returns to the share of college
graduates in a city. The eﬀects are larger for low qualiﬁed workers but also exist for college
graduates. In a similar paper, Moretti (2004b) documents external eﬀects of the regional
share of college graduates on the productivity of plants in that region. Additionally, he
reports an increase in labor costs that oﬀsets these productivity gains. Finally, Heuermann
(2008) uses instrumental variables estimations on panel data from German social security
and ﬁnds that the regional share of high-qualiﬁed workers raises the wages of both high-
and non-high-qualiﬁed workers. Moretti (2004c) provides an overview on these and other
eﬀects of regional human capital in cities.
On the ﬁrm-level, Battu, Belﬁeld and Sloane (2003) use cross-sectional linked-employer-
employee data from the UK and ﬁnd that a one standard deviation increase in the average
level of schooling in a plant (equaling 1.2 years) raises individual earning by 11 percent.
4Martin and Jin (2008) use linked-employer-employee panel data from Portugal and ﬁnd
large ﬁrm-level social returns on average wages between 14 percent and 23 percent per
year of average schooling. Mas and Moretti (2009) use data from a single ﬁrm to study
productivity spillovers in work-groups. They ﬁnd that low-productivity workers proﬁt from
the presence of a high-productivity workers in the same work-group.
Additionally, some studies are concerned with the eﬀects of industry wide human cap-
ital. Winter-Ebmer (1994) uses cross-sectional data from Austria and estimates external
returns to education to be in the magnitude of 4 percent to 9 percent per year of aver-
age schooling. Sakellariou (2001) ﬁnds no eﬀect of industry-wide schooling on individual
wages using cross-sectional data from Guatemala. Evidence from cross-sectional data from
Venezuela suggests external eﬀects in the magnitude of 3 percent to 9 percent per year of
average schooling (Sakellariou and Maysami 2004). Finally, using repeated cross-sections
from the UK, Kirby and Riley (2008) ﬁnd eﬀects in the magnitude of 2.6 percent to 3.9
percent per year of average schooling.
This paper builds on the previous empirical literature and considers for the ﬁrst time the
eﬀects of both regional and ﬁrm-level human capital.1 Distinguishing between these eﬀects
may be worthwhile for a variety of reasons. First, the two types of human capital may have
(theoretically) diﬀerent eﬀects: Learning and other types of technological human capital
spillovers require a certain level of interaction between workers (see e.g. the theoretical
model developed in Martins and Jin (2008)). As interactions between workers in the same
ﬁrm can be expected to occur more frequently than interactions between workers in the
same region, ﬁrm-level human capital seems more relevant than regional human capital
1I ignore the industry level due to data constraints. For the ﬁrm and regional level, the available
measures are calculated using data on the population of workers and consequently do not suﬀer from
sampling error. Such measures are not available for the industry level.
5in this case. Acemoglu’s (1996, 1997a) models are explicitly related to regional human
capital. In fact, relating his models to ﬁrm-level human capital seems rather far-fetched
as the models’ mechanisms are driven by ﬁrms’ imperfect information about the supply
of high-productivity workers. This lack of information seems unlikely with respect to the
ﬁrm’s own workforce. For arguments relating the external returns to education to improved
matching of workers and ﬁrms, one might argue that regional human capital, capturing e.g.
the number of jobs for high-qualiﬁed workers, may be more relevant than ﬁrm-level human
capital. Note, however, that I do not suggest that only ﬁrm-level human capital matters
for learning and only regional human capital matters for matching as e.g. learning may
also occur between ﬁrms and workers might improve job matches within ﬁrms by moving
in a diﬀerent department. Nevertheless, there is a clear possibility that the eﬀects of the
two types of human capital may diﬀer.
A second point that calls for a simultaneous consideration of these types of human
capital is the fact that ﬁrm-level and regional human capital are most likely (imperfectly)
positively correlated. Econometrically, this correlation implies that studies focusing on
only one type estimate a mixture of the true eﬀects of both types of capital. Such a
correlation is likely to be relevant as there are for instance high-tech clusters with many
ﬁrms employing a large number of high-qualiﬁed workers as well as rural areas with many
ﬁrms employing less qualiﬁed workers. However, the correlation is unlikely to be perfect
as there are also high-tech ﬁrms in otherwise rural counties and low-qualiﬁcation ﬁrms,
like the local fast-food-restaurant, in high-tech clusters. In fact, a look in the data used
in this study (see section 2 for details) reveals that the correlation between the ﬁrm-level
and regional shares of low- and medium-skilled labor are around 0.2 while the correlation
for high-skilled labor is around 0.4. Finally, as the previous literature has documented the
6existence of eﬀects for both ﬁrm-level and regional human capital, it is of interest to see
whether these are in fact two diﬀerent eﬀects or rather one single eﬀect which is identiﬁed
on diﬀerent levels of aggregation.
In this paper, I use panel data from German social security records at the individual and
aggregated at the ﬁrm2 and regional level. I estimate standard wage functions augmented
by various measures of ﬁrm-level and regional human capital while controlling for various
types of unobserved heterogeneity and time-varying confounders. Additionally, I look
at diﬀerences in the social returns to human capital for workers with diﬀerent levels of
individual education.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the social
security data used. First descriptive evidence using non-parametric regressions is found
in section 3. The econometric model is outlined in section 4, its results are presented in
section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
The individual level data used in this study comes from the so called employment panel
of the Federal Employment Agency (BA- Beschäftigtenpanel) for the years 2003 to 2006.
Speciﬁc information on an earlier version of the employment panel can be found in Koch
and Meinken (2004), the current version is described (in German) in Schmucker and Seth
(2009).
The individual data originates from social security information and is collected in the
2“Firm” in this context refers to the local production unit, the plant. “Firm” and “plant” are used
alternatively in this paper.
7so called employee history by the Federal Employment Agency.3 In Germany, employers
are obliged by German law to deliver annual information on their employees, as well as
additional information at the beginning and end of an employment, to social security.
These notiﬁcations are used to calculate pensions, as well as contributions to and beneﬁts
from health and unemployment insurance. The data contain information on the begin
and end of employment, daily wages, a person’s age and sex, as well as several variables
collected for statistical purposes, e.g. education or nationality. The resulting spell data
cover approximately 75 - 80% of the German workforce, excluding free-lancers, the self-
employed, civil servants and (unpaid) workers helping in family businesses (Koch and
Meinken 2004, p. 317).
The employment panel is drawn from the employee history in a two step procedure.
First, all persons born on one of seven speciﬁed dates are selected. As the German social
security number is tied to the date of birth and does not change over time, it is possible
to track those persons over time. Additionally, entries in and exits from the labor force
are automatically covered by this procedure as new entrants born on one of these dates
replace persons leaving the labor force. In a second step, the panel is formed by drawing
four cross-sections per year – on the last day of March, June, September and December
respectively – from this data. Finally, if a person receives unemployment beneﬁts or is in
an active labor market program on one of those days, an artiﬁcial observation indicating
this fact is generated from other data sources of the Federal Employment Agency. The
resulting panel is unbalanced due to entries into and exits from the labor force. However,
there is no missing information due to non-response. As most records in the data are based
on the annual notiﬁcations to social security, which means that there is essentially no wage
3More information on person-level data from German social security records can be found in Bender at
al. (2000).
8variation within the year for these observations, this study uses only the last observation
available for each year.
The person level data is combined with ﬁrm information that is formed by aggregating
social security data on the plant level. The plant data provide information on the structure
of the respective workforce regarding education, age and occupational position, the plant
size and the industry aﬃliation of the respective plant.
The data also contains information on the county (Kreis or Kreisfreie Stadt) where
the worker’s employer is located. A German Kreis is similar to the US counties in the
hierarchy of public administration. It is the third highest level of administration, placed
above the communal level, but below the Federal States (Bundesländer) and the country
administration, the Bund. A county usually covers several towns or villages (Kreis) or
one large city (Kreisfreie Stadt). In two cases, Berlin and Hamburg, it is also identical to
the Federal State (Bundesland). The average population of a county (in 2003) is 192,502
with the smallest county being the city of Zweibrücken with a population of 35,677 and the
largest county being Berlin with a population of 3,391,515. Note at this point that Berlin is
not in the sample as I focus on West Germany. Given that the economic conditions in East
and West Germany were still very diﬀerent at least at the beginning of the Millennium (see
e.g. Barrel and te Velde (2000), Franz and Steiner (2000) and Klodt (2000)), focusing on
West Germany allows me to ignore the eﬀects of the East German transformation process
and allows for a cleaner identiﬁcation of the human capital eﬀects. To capture the amount
of regional human capital, I again use social security records, in this case aggregated at the
county level and provided by the statistics department of the Federal Employment Agency.
This data can be accessed through the website www.regionalstatistik.de which is operated
by the Federal Statistical Oﬃce and the Statistical Oﬃces of the Federal States.
9Human capital on the ﬁrm or regional level is measured by the shares of low-skilled,
skilled and high-skilled workers in the total number of workers in the respective plant or re-
gion. Low-skilled workers are deﬁned as workers without post-school training, regardless of
the amount of secondary schooling, while skilled workers have completed vocational train-
ing and high-skilled workers are those with an academic degree. All values are calculated
without the education of the individual under observation to address potential endogeneity
concerns, for instance raised in Angrist and Pischke (2009, pp. 193-197). The measures of
individual human capital are formed in an identical way.
To arrive at the estimation sample, I ﬁrst drop persons younger than 25 and older
than 60 to avoid problems with ongoing education and early retirement. I further restrict
the sample to regular, full time workers, dropping trainees, home and part-time workers
as well as the unemployed. Wages that are top-coded at the contribution limit to social
security are imputed using a Tobit-based imputation as described in Gartner (2005). Note
that the wages of low-skilled and skilled workers are considerable less aﬀected by censoring
than those of high-skilled workers. This fact should be kept in mind when looking at the
results for the latter. Finally, I drop the top/bottom 1% of the wage distribution to control
for outliers and keep only West-German men to avoid problems with gender-speciﬁc labor
market participation and the large economic diﬀerences between East and West Germany.
The resulting sample covers 583,078 person-year-observations from 179,501 individuals of
which 26,219 individuals (76,704 observations) are low-skilled, 130,920 (422,882) are skilled
and 26,696 (83,492) are high-skilled workers. Individuals are observed for 3.25 periods on
average. There are at least 78 individuals in each county with an average of 620 individuals.
Descriptive statistics can be found in table 1.
(Table 1 about here.)
10Figure 1 displays the distributions of both ﬁrm-level and regional human capital ob-
served in the sample. Note that most workers are employed in ﬁrms with relatively low
shares of both high- and low-skilled workers, while most ﬁrms have a considerable share of
skilled workers. This ﬁnding is exactly what can be expected in Germany with its generally
skilled workforce. Note further that there is considerable more variation in the ﬁrm-level
than in the regional shares of the skill-groups which – relatively unsurprisingly – implies
that ﬁrms are more heterogeneous than regions with respect to human capital.
(Figure 1 about here.)
3 Descriptive evidence
To get a ﬁrst impression on the relationship between individual wages and regional and
ﬁrm-level human capital, ﬁgures 2 to 4 show non-parametric regression estimates based
on local polynomial regressions for all workers and various skill groups. Starting with the
relationship between the regional and ﬁrm-level shares of low-skilled workers displayed in
ﬁgure 2, one notices a relatively similar negative relationship between the ﬁrm-level share
and individual wages for all skill groups. This result is in line with learning based expla-
nations of human capital spillovers if one assumes that knowledge spillovers are unlikely
to occur from lower to higher qualiﬁed workers.
(Figure 2 about here.)
The relationship between wages and the regional share of low-skilled workers looks
more complicated. For low-skilled workers, we observe a negative relationship which is
inconsistent with explanations of human capital externalities involving matching eﬃciency
11where a higher number of low-skilled jobs should lead to higher wages for the low-skilled
through better matches. It is, however, consistent with a theory of regional knowledge
spillovers which are less likely the higher the share of low-skilled workers. For skilled
workers, we observe a U-shaped relationship with a relatively ﬂat bottom between shares
of 0.2 and 0.25. While the negative part of the relationship could be explained by reasoning
similar to that for the low-skilled workers, the increase at higher shares of low-skilled
workers is inconsistent with both learning and matching based explanations of human
capital externalities. For high-skilled workers, we observe again a negative relationship
that is relatively ﬂat at ﬁrst and quickly declines when the share of low-skilled workers
exceeds 0.25.
Looking at the ﬁrm-level shares of skilled workers displayed in ﬁgure 3, we see a positive
relationship with the wages of the low-skilled which is consistent with an explanation that
involves learning and knowledge spillovers from higher to lower qualiﬁed workers. For the
wages of skilled and high-skilled workers, we observe a hump-shaped relationship with a
relatively ﬂat top. The decline is stronger and begins at lower shares for skilled than for
high-skilled workers which may be related to skill premia at the ﬁrm-level that vanish with
an increasing abundance of the respective skill group.
(Figure 3 about here.)
At the regional level, we see an unequivocally negative relationship for all skill groups.
This relationship is relatively stronger for low-skilled and skilled workers than for high-
skilled workers which is consistent with a market based explanation where wages are driven
down by an increase in labor supply. The somewhat weaker eﬀect for high-skilled workers
could be related to smaller possibilities to substitute high-qualiﬁed with lesser qualiﬁed
12labor but this reasoning is mostly speculative.
Finally, consider the results for the regional and ﬁrm-level shares of high-skilled workers
displayed in ﬁgure 4. Here, we observe a positive relationship between the ﬁrm-level shares
and the wages of low-skilled and skilled workers. This result is again consistent with
productivity enhancing learning-spillovers from higher to lower educated workers. For
high-skilled workers, the estimates suggest a hump shaped relationship with a relatively
ﬂat top which is similar to the relationship found for the monthly wages of skilled or
high-skilled workers and the ﬁrm-level share of skilled workers.
(Figure 4 about here.)
For the regional shares of high-skilled workers, the results show a unequivocally positive
relationship with the wages of all skill group. Note that this result is consistent with both
theories of regional knowledge spillovers and with Acemoglu’s (1996) model of pecuniary
externalities, but does not seem to ﬁt matching based theories very well. While a higher
number of high-qualiﬁed jobs in a speciﬁc region might improve the job-matching of high-
qualiﬁed workers, there is no compelling reason to assume that the job-matching-process
of low-skilled or skilled workers should be improved by a higher number of high-qualiﬁed
jobs.
To sum up, the initial conjecture that there may be diﬀerences in the relationship be-
tween wages and regional and ﬁrm-level human capital respectively seems to be supported
by the data. Some general conclusions can be drawn from the results. First, every worker
regardless of his educational level proﬁts from the presence of higher educated workers in
the same ﬁrm. This ﬁnding is consistent with a story where lower skilled workers learn
from higher skilled workers and become more productive as a result. Second, with the
13exception of low-skilled workers, one usually observes a hump-shaped relationship with a
relatively large ﬂat top between wages and the ﬁrm-level shares of equally or slightly less
qualiﬁed workers. This ﬁnding could be related to two explanations: The rising and then
constant relationship at lower to medium shares may be explained by the importance of a
certain level of (intellectual) exchange among peers, e.g. similar workers, that is produc-
tivity enhancing, while the negative relationship at higher shares could be related to the
decline of skill premia caused by an abundance of these skills in a particular ﬁrm. Third, we
typically observe negative or at most U-shaped relationships between the regional shares of
low-skilled and skilled workers and wages for both skilled and low-skilled individuals. This
result would be in line with an explanation where an excess labor supply drives down wages
and outweighs possible improvements in matching eﬃciency. Finally, this eﬀect does not
show up for the regional share of high-skilled workers, where we observe a unequivocally
positive relationship with wages regardless of the individual skill level. This result is in
line with both learning based explanations for human capital capital externalities as well
as with Acemoglu’s (1996) model of pecuniary externalities.
4 Econometric model
While the previous section provided ﬁrst evidence on the existence of externalities of var-
ious types of human capital, there is no reason to assume that these simple descriptive
results can be seen as causal relationships. High-productivity individuals may select into
counties or ﬁrms with highly-educated peers which could create spurious correlations be-
tween regional or ﬁrm-level human capital and individual wages. Similarly, there are several
county level characteristics, for instance the regional industry structure, that may very well
be correlated with both regional human capital and individual wages. Phrased in terms
14of counterfactual reasoning, to identify the eﬀect of regional or ﬁrm-level human capital
on individual wages, we would like to compare the same individual observed in the same
ﬁrm/industry in the same county in the same year with the same economic conditions but
with diﬀerent amounts of regional or ﬁrm-level human capital. While this is obviously
impossible, I use a simple standard earnings equation with a more-way error-component
structure augmented with measures of regional and ﬁrm-level human capital to control for
possible observed and unobserved confounders and come close to this ideal. Speciﬁcally,
the estimating equation can be written as
yifjct = i + c + t + j + 0Xit + 0Wft + 0Zct + f  HCft + c  HCct + it (1)
where yifjct is the monthly log real wage of worker i in ﬁrm f in industry j situated in
county c at time t. i, c, t and j are individual, county, time and (1-digit)-industry
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. HCft and HCct are the shares of low- and high-skilled workers at
the ﬁrm and county level respectively with f and c being the parameters of interest.
As the descriptive evidence in the previous section suggested possible non-linearities, both
measures contain a second order polynomial. Xit contains time varying control variables on
the person level, speciﬁcally age and age squared. Wft contains time-varying variables on
the ﬁrm-level, speciﬁcally ﬁrm size and the age structure of the plant’s workforce measured
by the shares of workers below 30, between 40 and 49 and with 50 and more years of
age. Zct contains potential time-varying county-level confounders, speciﬁcally the regional
unemployment rate and average sales in manufacturing per worker as proxies for regional
economic conditions as well as the regional population to account for basic demographic
changes. Finally, it is a standard error term that is assumed to be uncorrelated with both
HCft and HCct given the other variables and ﬁxed eﬀects.
15The central identifying assumption in this setup is that it is indeed uncorrelated with
both HCft and HCct given the observed controls and the unobserved ﬁxed eﬀects. There
are several potential threats to the validity of this assumption that have to be considered.
First, there might be ﬁrm-speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity that could be related to both
ﬁrm-level human capital and individual wages. As the data is no true linked-employer-
employee-dataset and does not contain ﬁrm identiﬁers, it is not possible to directly control
for this heterogeneity. However, the data contains a variable that indicates whether an
individual changed ﬁrms from one period to the other. Using this information, I re-estimate
equation (1) using only individuals who stay in the same plant and the same county during
the observation period. For these cases, individual, county and ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects are
empirically identical and controlled for by a standard ﬁxed eﬀects estimator. Additionally,
this model allows for time-industry speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects and controls for the same time-
varying confounders used in the base estimation.
Second, there might be concerns related to time-varying (observed and unobserved)
confounders on the county level. The ﬁrst is that the variables in Zct that are included to
control for basic economic conditions on the county level may themselves be outcomes of
regional human capital. If, for instance, the regional share of high-qualiﬁed workers inﬂu-
ences regional unemployment and if regional unemployment inﬂuences wages, controlling
for regional unemployment would eliminate this (indirect) wage eﬀect of regional human
capital. To allow for this possibility, I use a more parsimonious model without the regional
control variables and with year-industry-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects instead of t and j.
Another possible concern is the omission of important regional variables that inﬂuence
both regional capital and wages. While the inclusion of the regional unemployment quota,
the regional population and regional manufacturing sales control for some of the prime
16candidates for economic shocks that may inﬂuence both labor migration and regional wage
levels, this concern remains valid. Unfortunately, the inclusion of time-county-ﬁxed eﬀects
as an easy remedy is not possible as regional human capital varies only on a year-county-
base which makes it multicollinear with county-speciﬁc trends. I also experimented with
county-industry-year-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects similar to Moretti (2004b). However, this ap-
proach turned out be computationally impossible even given the (rather large) resources
of the research data center of the the Federal Employment Agency in the Institute of Em-
ployment Research.4 Finally, I tried a (panel) instrumental variable approach similar to
Moretti (2004c) where I instrumented ﬁrm-level and regional human capital with variables
related to the regional supply of workers with various skill-levels in a ﬁxed-eﬀects regression
on the sample of individuals without ﬁrm change. While the instruments, speciﬁcally the
county-level numbers of school-dropouts, of graduates with a German Abitur, of students
in vocational schools and of vocational schools, the Bundesland level shares of research and
development expenditures in universities of GNP, of research and development personnel
in universities of all workers and the percentage of university graduates in each age cohort
(each as a second order polynomial), were shown to be valid, the estimates suﬀered from
severe weak instrument problems rendering them uninformative.
Note that equation (1) does not contain measures of individual schooling. Given the
individual ﬁxed eﬀects i, identiﬁcation of the private returns to education would rely on
individuals changing their educational status. However, as education in Germany typically
takes place in the form of full-time education before entering the labor market as full-time
regular employees, such simultaneous variation of wages and measures of education within
4In fact, estimation of these more-way error-component (or more-way ﬁxed-eﬀects) models is known
to be computationally non trivial for datasets of the size used in this paper (see Andrews, Schank and
Upward 2006). Estimation of the current model was possible using the Stata ado-ﬁle felsdvreg by Thomas
Cornelissen (see Cornelissen 2006, 2008 for a description).
17workers would likely be caused by special cases, e.g. individuals ﬁnishing evening schools.
As the descriptive evidence in section 3 also suggests diﬀerences in the social returns to
education for workers with diﬀerent educational levels, I estimate equation (1) separately
for low-skilled, skilled and high-skilled workers. Low-skilled workers are again those without
post-school training, while skilled workers have completed vocational training and high-
skilled workers are those with an academic degree. Equation (1) is estimated with both
regional and ﬁrm-level human capital as well as separately with only one of the measures
to gauge the importance of collinearity between ﬁrm-level and regional human capital for
the results. As some of the variables of interest vary only on the county level, all standard
errors are adjusted for clustering on the county level (see Moulton 1990).
5 Results
Consider the econometric results displayed in table 2. Columns (i), (ii) and (iii) are vari-
ations of the base estimates shown in equation (1) estimated with either ﬁrm-level or
regional human capital or both, column (iv) gives the results of a model without regional
control variables and industry-year-speciﬁc trends instead of the separate industry and
time eﬀects. Finally, the results in column (v) are obtained using the sample of individuals
without ﬁrm change which implicitly controls for ﬁrm-speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity.
Before going into detailed comments, note that the results, in particular for the regional
and ﬁrm-level shares of high-skilled workers, are very similar across models which mitigates
the initial concerns about plant-speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity. Note
further, that – unsurprisingly given the relative size of the skill groups – the results for all
workers without distinguishing between skill groups are generally similar to those for the
skilled workers.
18(Table 2 about here.)
To summarize the central results from table 2, we observe a remarkably similar and sta-
ble positive hump-shaped relationship between the ﬁrm-level share of high-skilled workers
and the wages of low-skilled and skilled workers. This relationship is also found when con-
trolling for ﬁrm-speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity in column (v). For high-skilled workers,
the point estimates suggest a similar pattern but are never signiﬁcant. This result may – at
least partially – be related to the higher level of censoring that aﬀects the wages of this skill
group. As we cannot expect the wage imputation to completely overcome this problem,
somewhat smaller eﬀects and less precise estimates may be expected for this group. In
general, this result is perfectly in line with learning-based explanations of human capital
externalities where lower-skilled individuals learn through interacting with higher skilled
workers. Empirically, this result is qualitatively similar to the previous studies by Battu,
Belﬁeld and Sloane (2003), Martins and Jin (2008) and Mas and Moretti (2009).
Turning to the remaining estimates, another result that is relatively stable across skill
groups and models is the non-existent relationship between individual wages and the re-
gional share of high-skilled workers. Here, we observe a signiﬁcant result only for the
squared term and only when looking at skilled workers and dropping all regional control
variables. These results do not support any of the theories that predict a link between
regional high-skilled labor and individual wages, for instance theories of local learning or
– through the fact that the wages of the high-skilled are also uninﬂuenced – matching
based theories. Note, however, that the presence of county-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects implies
that identiﬁcation of these education eﬀects uses longitudinal variation within counties.
As regions are relatively homogeneous over time, the within variation of regional human
capital is very small which may be responsible for the lack of statistical signiﬁcance.
19For the regional and ﬁrm-level shares of low-skilled workers, the results are somewhat
more inconclusive. Low-skilled and in particular skilled workers’ wages seem to be nega-
tively related to the (squared) ﬁrm-level shares of low-skilled workers. However, for the
low-skilled this eﬀect only appears when restricting the sample to individuals without ﬁrm
change. For high-skilled workers we observe a positive relationship between individual
wages and the ﬁrm-level shares of low-skilled workers. When restricting the sample to
workers without a ﬁrm change, we additionally see evidence for a non-linear (u-shaped)
relationship. There is unfortunately no previous empirical evidence or theoretical expla-
nation that would help to put these ﬁndings into perspective. The results are similarly
inconclusive for the regional shares of low-skilled workers. Here, we observe a u-shaped
relationship for low-skilled and skilled workers when restricting the sample to workers with-
out a ﬁrm change. Similar, though insigniﬁcant results are also found when dropping all
regional controls. For the base estimates and high-skilled workers in general, there does
not seem to be a stable relationship between the regional shares of low-skilled workers and
individual wages. Unfortunately, there is again no previous evidence that could help to
explain these results.
To help the interpretation of the results, ﬁgures 5 and 6 present simulated wage increases
for changes in the regional and ﬁrm-level shares of the respective education group using
the results for the stayer sample from column (v) of table 2. Remember that these are
the results that are least likely to suﬀer from biases related to unobserved heterogeneity.
Simulations based on the results from the base model in column (i) are very similar and
can be found in the appendix. The range of values that is considered in the simulations has
been restricted to lie between the respective sample minima and maxima to avoid out-of-
sample predictions. Remember from the density estimates in ﬁgure 1 that the distributions
20of the ﬁrm-level shares of low- and high-skilled workers are both right-skewed with most
individuals being in ﬁrms with less than 40% low-skilled and less than 20% high-skilled
workers. On a regional level, most individuals work in regions with between 10% and 25%
low-skilled and between 3% and 15% high-skilled workers.
(Figures 5 and 6 about here.)
Starting with ﬁgure 5 and the ﬁrm-level shares of low-skilled workers, we notice that
wage eﬀects are typically very small over the empirically relevant shares from 0% to 40%.
For low-skilled and skilled workers, we observe wage drops of less than 2% when increasing
the ﬁrm-level shares from 0% to 40%. For high-skilled workers, we observe corresponding
wage increases by less than 1%. For the regional shares of low-skilled workers, we observe
rather large wage penalties between 2% and 4% for low-skilled workers. Note that these
penalties are declining with an increasing regional employment of low-skilled workers. If
one sees the local share of low-skilled workers as an indicator for the regional number of
jobs for low-skilled workers, this decline would be broadly in line with supply and demand-
based explanations. For skilled workers, we observe smaller wage penalties of 1% to 2%
that are also declining with an increasing regional share of low-skilled workers. For high-
skilled workers, the simulations suggest rather large wage premia of 3.5% to 4%. However,
as the (positive) linear term is not and the (negative) quadratic term is only borderline
signiﬁcant, it seems sensible not to put too much weight on this result.
Consider now the simulated wage increases related to the ﬁrm-level and regional shares
of high-skilled workers that are displayed in ﬁgure 6. For low-skilled and skilled workers,
the results suggest relative similar wage eﬀects between slightly above 0% to 3% for the
empirical relevant ﬁrm-level shares between 0% and 20%. For high-skilled workers the
21simulations suggest much higher eﬀects in the magnitude of up to 10%. However, the
underlying coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcant on conventional levels. Note that these eﬀects,
although they are not directly comparable due to diﬀerent deﬁnitions of human capital,
seem somewhat smaller than those found by Battu, Belﬁeld and Sloane (2003) and Martin
and Jin (2008). A possible explanation for this divergence of results is the fact that
Battu, Belﬁeld and Sloane (2003) cannot control for ﬁrm- and individual-speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects, while Martins and Jin (2008) who conduct a ﬁrm-level analysis cannot control for
unobserved heterogenity of individuals. For the regional shares of high-skilled workers, the
results suggest relative minor wage eﬀects for skilled and high-skilled workers. For low-
skilled workers, the simulations suggest rather large wage penalties associated with higher
regional shares of high-skilled workers. However, as the regional eﬀects are again based on
insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients, none of them should be taken too seriously.
To sum up, the results of this paper suggest signiﬁcant positive eﬀects of the ﬁrm-level
share of high-skilled workers on the wages of low-skilled and skilled workers but not on
the wages of high-skilled workers. This ﬁnding is in line with learning based theories of
human capital externalities, at least if one is willing to assume that learning-spillovers are
more likely from higher to lower educated workers. However, the wage increases caused
by variation in the ﬁrm-level share of high-skilled workers are often relatively small over
empirically relevant shares. In some estimations I also ﬁnd negative wage eﬀects for the
regional shares of low-skilled workers. No such eﬀects are found for the ﬁrm-level shares
of low-skilled workers and the regional shares of high-skilled workers. While the lack of
signiﬁcance of the results for regional human capital may be related to the relatively small
longitudinal variation within regions, the estimated eﬀects are also often small in economic
terms. Overall, the results suggest that learning-spillovers from high- to low-skilled workers
22might matter on the ﬁrm level, while no support is found for the existence of social returns
to education on the regional level.
6 Conclusion
This paper provided evidence on the anatomy of human capital externalities arising from
both ﬁrm-level and regional human capital. Using panel data from German social security
records at the individual, ﬁrm and regional level, I estimated earnings functions augmented
with measures of ﬁrm-level and regional human capital while controlling for various types
of unobserved heterogeneity. The results show robust support for the existence of social
returns to the ﬁrm-level share of high-skilled workers for low-skilled and skilled workers.
No such eﬀects exist for high-skilled workers. This ﬁnding is in line with the existence of
learning spillovers from higher to lower qualiﬁed workers within ﬁrms. However, the wage
eﬀects are often quite small over empirically relevant shares. No eﬀects are found for the
ﬁrm-level shares of low-skilled workers and the regional shares of high-skilled workers. For
the regional share of low-skilled workers, the evidence is more inconclusive with negative
eﬀects being found in some estimations. While the lack of signiﬁcance of the results for
regional human capital might be explained by the relatively small longitudinal variation of
human capital within regions, the estimated eﬀects are also often small in economic terms.
Taken together, the results are in line with learning spillovers at the ﬁrm level. However,
they provide relatively few support for either theories of regional learning spillovers or
matching based explanations of human capital externalities.
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278 Tables and ﬁgures
Figure 1: Observed distributions of regional and firm-level human capital
variables, Kernel-density estimates
(a) Firm-level share of low-skilled workers (b) Regional share of low-skilled workers
(c) Firm-level share of skilled workers (d) Regional share of skilled workers
(e) Firm-level share of high-skilled workers (f) Regional share of high-skilled workers
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29Figure 2: Non-parametric regression estimates: Real monthly wages and
firm-level or regional shares of low-skilled workers
(a) Firm-level share of low-skilled workers
and general wages
(b) Regional share of low-skilled workers and
general wages
(c) Firm-level share of low-skilled workers
and wages of the low-skilled
(d) Regional share of low-skilled workers and
wages of the low-skilled
(e) Firm-level share of low-skilled workers
and wages of the skilled
(f) Regional share of low-skilled workers and
wages of the skilled
(g) Firm-level share of low-skilled workers
and wages of the high-skilled
(h) Regional share of low-skilled workers and
wages of the high-skilled
Note: Local polynomial smoothing, 95% conﬁdence bounds in grey.
30Figure 3: Non-parametric regression estimates: Real monthly wages and
firm-level or regional shares of skilled workers
(a) Firm-level share of skilled workers and
general wages
(b) Regional share of skilled workers and
general wages
(c) Firm-level share of skilled workers and
wages of the low-skilled
(d) Regional share of skilled workers and
wages of the low-skilled
(e) Firm-level share of skilled workers and
wages of the skilled
(f) Regional share of skilled workers and
wages of the skilled
(g) Firm-level share of skilled workers and
wages of the high-skilled
(h) Regional share of skilled workers and
wages of the high-skilled
Note: Local polynomial smoothing, 95% conﬁdence bounds in grey.
31Figure 4: Non-parametric regression estimates: Real monthly wages and
firm-level or regional shares of high-skilled workers
(a) Firm-level share of high-skilled workers
and general wages
(b) Regional share of high-skilled workers
and general wages
(c) Firm-level share of high-skilled workers
and wages of the low-skilled
(d) Regional share of high-skilled workers
and wages of the low-skilled
(e) Firm-level share of high-skilled workers
and wages of the skilled
(f) Regional share of high-skilled workers
and wages of the skilled
(g) Firm-level share of high-skilled workers
and wages of the high-skilled
(h) Regional share of high-skilled workers
and wages of the high-skilled
Note: Local polynomial smoothing, 95% conﬁdence bounds in grey.
32Table 2: Fixed-effects-regression results, parameters of interest, West-
German men, dependent variable: log real monthly wages (e, in 2000 prices)
Variable Base estimates No regional Individuals without
controls ﬁrm change
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
All individuals
Firm: Share of low-skilled workers .0350* (–) .0355** .0387** .0392***
(.0179) (.0181) (.0171) (.0106)
Firm: Share of low-skilled workers -.1410*** (–) -.1407*** -.1437*** -.1474***
(squared) (.0297) (.0297) (.0288) (.0188)
Firm: Share of high-skilled workers .2049*** (–) .2050*** .2010*** .1852***
(.0175) (.0176) (.0173) (.0150)
Firm: Share of high-skilled workers -.1806*** (–) -.1800*** -.1769*** -.1651***
(squared) (.0227) (.0227) (.0226) (.0213)
Region: Share of low-skilled workers .0283 .0334 (–) -.4585 -.5771***
(.4154) (.4125) (.4411) (.1480)
Region: Share of low-skilled workers .4921 .3908 (–) 1.8736* 2.0014***
(squared) (.9560) (.9534) (1.0510) (.3528)
Region: Share of high-skilled workers .0480 .0498 (–) -.2500 -.1469
(.3774) (.3807) (.3931) (.1198)
Region: Share of high-skilled workers 1.1243 1.1649 (–) 2.0522 .6887
(squared) (1.4705) (1.5037) (1.5929) (.4501)
No. of Obs. 583,078 547,347
No. of Indiv. 179,501 166,737
Low-skilled individuals
Firm: Share of low-skilled workers -.0306 (–) -.0302 -.0256 -.0079
(.0416) (.0416) (.0415) (.0338)
Firm: Share of low-skilled workers -.0291 (–) . -.0292 -.0325 -.0700*
(squared) (.0465) (.0465) (.0467) (.0384)
Firm: Share of high-skilled workers .2345*** (–) 2329*** .2284** .1910***
(.0627) (.0627) (.0630) (.0495)
Firm: Share of high-skilled workers -.1903* (–) -.1852* -.1819* -.1726*
(squared) (.1071) (.1081) (.1083) (.1001)
Region: Share of low-skilled workers -.0185 -.0697 (–) -.8683 -.7679**
(.5242) (.5208) (.6015) (.3751)
Region: Share of low-skilled workers .6005 .6471 (–) 2.8776* 2.9332***
(squared) (1.1920) (1.1895) (1.5351) (.8638)
Region: Share of high-skilled workers -.4111 -.4659 (–) -.8364 -.5928
(.8400) (.8391) (.8062) (.3985)
Region: Share of high-skilled workers 1.3567 1.5803 (–) 3.2600 1.5994
(squared) (2.7194) (2.6980) (2.6421) (1.4691)
No. of Obs. 76,704 72,418
No. of Indiv. 26,219 24,115
Skilled individuals
Firm: Share of low-skilled workers .0035 (–) .0036 .0093 .0063
(.0201) (.0202) (.0189) (.0120)
Firm: Share of low-skilled workers -.0724** (–) -.0718** -.0771** -.0721***
(squared) (.0327) (.0329) (.0315) (.0226)
Firm: Share of high-skilled workers .2075*** (–) .2074*** .2004*** .1738***
(.0222) (.0223) (.0214) (.0177)
Firm: Share of high-skilled workers -.1904*** (–) -.1889*** -.1840*** -.1283***
(squared) (.0363) (.0363) (.0352) (.0296)
Region: Share of low-skilled workers .1001 .0868 (–) -.3149 -.3345*
(.4217) (.4232) (.4327) (.1796)
Region: Share of low-skilled workers .1521 .1199 (–) 1.3851 1.3197***
(squared) (.9362) (.9516) (.9836) (.4196)
Region: Share of high-skilled workers -.0424 -.0413 (–) -.3318 -.0926
(.3636) (.3654) (.3962) (.1498)
Region: Share of high-skilled workers 1.7490 1.8283 (–) 2.7472* .8697
(squared) (1.5134) (1.5662) (1.6357) (.5888)
No. of Obs. 422,882 398,670
No. of Indiv. 130,920 121,939
High-skilled individuals
Firm: Share of low-skilled workers .0688** (–) .0683** .0689** .0519*
(.0342) (.0343) (.0345) (.0311)
Firm: Share of low-skilled workers -.1145 (–) -.1147 -.1128 -.1128*
(squared) (.0714) (.0715) (.0719) (.0639)
Firm: Share of high-skilled workers .0581 (–) .0581 .0613 .0403
(.0375) (.0375) (.0376) (.0332)
Firm: Share of high-skilled workers -.0667 (–) -.0671 -.0695 -.0541
(squared) (.0463) (.0464) (.0466) (.0379)
Region: Share of low-skilled workers .3280 .3281 (–) .3842 .4817
(.5296) (.5286) (.5056) (.3374)
Region: Share of low-skilled workers -.6671 -.6587 (–) -.8269 -1.4069*
(squared) (1.3564) (1.3676) (1.3439) (.8482)
Region: Share of high-skilled workers .3301 .3551 (–) .2733 .1847
(.5363) (.5416) (.4630) (.2339)
Region: Share of high-skilled workers -2.3423 -2.4122 (–) -2.0914 -1.2309
(squared) (1.5247) (1.5381) (1.3230) (.7853)
No. of Obs. 83,492 76,259
No. of Indiv. 26,696 23,995
Coeﬃcients, standard errors adjusted for clustering at the county level in parentheses. ***/**/* denote signiﬁcance on the 1%, 5%
and 10% level respectively. Columns (i), (ii) and (iii) include individual, regional (county) and year-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, 1-digit
industries, age and age-squared, ﬁrm size measured by the number of employees, the shares of workers below 30, between 40 and
50 and above 50 years of age, the regional unemployment quota, regional manufacturing sales per head and the regional population.
Columns (iv) and (v) contain individual, regional and industry-year ﬁxed eﬀects. Column (iv) excludes the regional unemployment
quota, regional manufacturing sales per head and the regional population. The estimates in column (v) also control for ﬁrm-speciﬁc
unobserved heterogeneity.
33Figure 5: Simulated wage changes by firm-level and regional shares of low-
skilled workers, individuals without firm change
(a) Firm-level share of low-skilled workers
and general wages
(b) Regional share of low-skilled workers and
general wages
(c) Firm-level share of low-skilled workers
and wages of the low-skilled
(d) Regional share of low-skilled workers and
wages of the low-skilled
(e) Firm-level share of low-skilled workers
and wages of the skilled
(f) Regional share of low-skilled workers and
wages of the skilled
(g) Firm-level share of low-skilled workers
and wages of the high-skilled
(h) Regional share of low-skilled workers and
wages of the high-skilled
Note: Simulations are based on the coeﬃcients from column (v) of table 2. The range of the simulations
has been restricted to values between the sample minimum and maximum to avoid out-of-sample
predictions. 34Figure 6: Simulated wage changes by firm-level and regional shares of high-
skilled workers, individuals without firm change
(a) Firm-level share of high-skilled workers
and general wages
(b) Regional share of high-skilled workers
and general wages
(c) Firm-level share of high-skilled workers
and wages of the high-skilled
(d) Regional share of high-skilled workers
and wages of the high-skilled
(e) Firm-level share of high-skilled workers
and wages of the skilled
(f) Regional share of high-skilled workers
and wages of the skilled
(g) Firm-level share of high-skilled workers
and wages of the high-skilled
(h) Regional share of high-skilled workers
and wages of the high-skilled
Note: Simulations are based on the coeﬃcients from column (v) of table 2. The range of the simulations
has been restricted to values between the sample minimum and maximum to avoid out-of-sample
predictions. 359 Appendix: Additional ﬁgures
36Figure 7: Simulated wage changes by firm-level and regional shares of low-
skilled workers, base estimates
(a) Firm-level share of low-skilled workers
and general wages
(b) Regional share of low-skilled workers and
general wages
(c) Firm-level share of low-skilled workers
and wages of the low-skilled
(d) Regional share of low-skilled workers and
wages of the low-skilled
(e) Firm-level share of low-skilled workers
and wages of the skilled
(f) Regional share of low-skilled workers and
wages of the skilled
(g) Firm-level share of low-skilled workers
and wages of the high-skilled
(h) Regional share of low-skilled workers and
wages of the high-skilled
Note: Simulations are based on the coeﬃcients from column (i) of table 2. The range of the simulations
has been restricted to values between the sample minimum and maximum to avoid out-of-sample
predictions. 37Figure 8: Simulated wage changes by firm-level and regional shares of high-
skilled workers, base estimates
(a) Firm-level share of high-skilled workers
and general wages
(b) Regional share of high-skilled workers
and general wages
(c) Firm-level share of high-skilled workers
and wages of the high-skilled
(d) Regional share of high-skilled workers
and wages of the high-skilled
(e) Firm-level share of high-skilled workers
and wages of the skilled
(f) Regional share of high-skilled workers
and wages of the skilled
(g) Firm-level share of high-skilled workers
and wages of the high-skilled
(h) Regional share of high-skilled workers
and wages of the high-skilled
Note: Simulations are based on the coeﬃcients from column (i) of table 2. The range of the simulations
has been restricted to values between the sample minimum and maximum to avoid out-of-sample
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